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SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY V. BNSF
RAILWAY CO. AND ITS EFFECT ON LITIGATION
CHALLENGING BIA’S NEW RIGHTS-OF-WAY
REGULATIONS
Kaelen H. Brodie*
INTRODUCTION
In April 2015, the Swinomish Tribe (Tribe) sued
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) for
trespass and breach of contract, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief.1 The Tribe alleged that BNSF was—and still is—violating a
right-of-way easement agreement, which the Tribe and the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) granted to BNSF on July 19, 1991,
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-28 and 25 C.F.R Part 169. The
easement allowed BNSF to run trains through the Swinomish Tribe
Reservation to refineries at March Point, near Anacortes,
Washington. The easement further required that, “unless otherwise
agreed in writing, only one eastern bound train, and one western
bound train (of twenty-five cars or less) shall cross the Reservation
each day.”2 BNSF is now running six 100-car unit trains per week
through the reservation in each direction, which is four times as
many railcars per day as are permitted under the explicit terms of
the agreement.3

*

Kaelen Brodie will graduate from Seattle University School of Law in May of
2017. After graduation, Kaelen will clerk for the Honorable Commissioners
Schmidt and Bearse at the Washington State Court of Appeals in Tacoma. He
wishes to thank Chloe Thompson, Attorney at Snoqualmie Indian Tribe and
adjunct professor of Indian law at Seattle University School of Law, as well as
Sarah Lawson, attorney for Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, for their advice and
edits. In addition, he would like to thank the staff of the American Indian Law
Journal, including Tracey Cook-Lee and Danielle Bargala, for their support,
advice, and edits.
1
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, Trespass, and Breach
of Contract, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C15-543RSL
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2015), 2017 WL 132448.
(The motion for summary judgement was heard Dec. 15, 2016 before the
Honorable Robert Lasnik).
2
Right-of-Way Easement—Burlington Northern, Swinomish Indian Tribe
Community, at 10. http://www.swinomishnsn.gov/media/43924/1991_sitc___bnsf_right_of_way_easement_v1_0.pdf
3
Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.
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The agreement placed a limitation on the ability of the Tribe to
control the amount of traffic on the tracks. It stipulated that “[t]he
number of trains and cars shall not be increased unless required by
shipper needs,” but “[t]he Tribe agrees not to arbitrarily withhold
permission to increase the number of trains or cars when necessary
to meet shipper needs.” 4 BNFS has not asked the Tribe for
permission to increase the number of trains running through the
Reservation. This resistance is likely due, in part, to the fact that
shipping crude is lucrative for BNSF, particularly with the current
boom in oil production in the United States.
Since 2008, crude oil production has nearly doubled, having
increased from 5 million to 9.4 million barrels per day. 5 The
uptick in production has put substantial pressure on railroads to
transport the growing amount of crude oil to refineries. The
increase in crude oil production has largely affected landlocked
states that lack the ability to transport crude oil via pipeline or
boat.6 Without pipelines or ships to transport oil, railroads now are
the dominant method of crude oil transportation, particularly from
the Bakken Shale Formation in northwestern North Dakota, eastern
Montana, and southern Canada.
The Tribe’s lawsuit has environmental and monetary
consequences not only for the Tribe and BNSF, but also for
companies shipping crude to the refinery in Anacortes. Tesoro
Refining & Marketing Company (Tesoro) ships Bakken crude to
Cherry Point, and the outcome of this case will have an enormous
impact on how lucrative and worthwhile such an operation will be.
Consequently, Tesoro filed a petition with the Surface
Transportation Board (STB)7 on June 3, 2016, requesting “the STB
to reaffirm that federal law protects the rights of shippers to

4

Right-of-Way Easement, supra note 2.
Petroleum and Other Liquids: U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2017),
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS2&f
=A (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
6
Assn. of American Railroads, U.S. Rail Crude Oil Traffic, 3 (Nov. 2015),
available at
https://www.aar.org/BackgroundPapers/US%20Rail%20Crude%20Oil%20Traff
ic.pdf.
7
Overview of the STB, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
https://www.stb.gov/stb/about/overview.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (“The
Surface Transportation Board is an independent adjudicatory and economicregulatory agency charged by Congress with resolving railroad rate and service
disputes and reviewing proposed railroad mergers.”).
5
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request and receive rail service... and further affirm that this right
to service may not be infringed on the basis of contractual or other
commitments and rights that may exist between a landowner and
the railroad.” 8 The STB denied this petition on November 14,
2016.9
Tesoro is not the only oil company that has considered using a
refinery at Cherry Point to refine crude oil. Shell Oil Products US
(Shell) does not currently ship Bakken crude, but it does have a
refinery at Cherry Point that receives crude oil by ship and pipeline
from Alaska’s North Slope. 10 Shell intended to begin shipping
crude oil by rail, but ultimately cancelled its plan to construct an
additional rail spur at Cherry Point on October 6, 2016.11 Although
the project inspired protests, Shell said it was calling off the project
because of the falling price of crude oil, something that could
quickly change based on prevailing market conditions. 12 Any
expansion would further increase rail traffic through the
Reservation.13
On January 13, 2017, Judge Lasnik in the Western District of
Washington granted in part and denied in part the Tribe’s motion
for summary judgment. 14 He held that Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) does not preempt or
8

Petition of Tesoro Refining & Marketing Co., LLC for Declaratory Order at 2,
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. BNSF, (W.D. Wash. filed Apr. 7, 2015)
(STB Finance Docket No. 36041) available at
https://www.stb.gov/Filings/all.nsf/WEBUNID/04D6729A21B0BD6185257FC
A0048EBFB/$file/240861.pdf.
9
Surface Transportation Board Decision, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v.
BNSF, (S.T.B. Nov. 14, 2016) (No. FD 36041) 2016 WL 6809953, available at
https://www.stb.gov/decisions/readingroom.nsf/UNID/049FF70E922F20788525
806C00790CCF/$file/45330.pdf (“Given that the [Western District of
Washington] has already denied a motion to refer the preemption issue to the
[Surface Transportation] Board, that courts as well as the Board can decide
issues involving § 10501(b) preemption in the first instance, and that the
[Western District of Washington] has clearly expressed its preference to decide
the preemption issue itself, the Board will decline to issue a declaratory order in
this matter”).
10
Shell Calls off Oil-by-Rail Projects in Anacortes, THE BELLINGHAM HERALD
(Oct. 6, 2016),
http://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/local/article106568582.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2017).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF
Ry. Co., (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2016) (No. 2:15-cv-00543RSL) 2017 WL
132448.
14
Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Swinomish Indian
Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. C15-543RSL).
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supersede the Indian Right-of-Way Act (IRWA), and the Tribe
may move forward with a state law claim for damages, compelled
disclosure, and an adjustment in rent.15 On the other hand Judge
Lasnik also explained that, “an injunction limiting the type of
cargo or the number of trains or cars crossing the reservation—
whether under a breach of contract, trespass, or estoppel theory—
those remedies are unavailable in this jurisdiction.” 16 Thereafter,
on June 8, 2017, the court reversed itself on the injunction issue
and took the unusual step of granting the Tribe’s motion for
reconsideration.17 The parties will now set a potential trial date.18
Part I of this article will discuss the history of litigation
between the Swinomish Tribe and BNSF (and its predecessors),
the dangers of transporting crude oil, and the important statutes in
question. Part II of this article will argue that BNFS is bound by
the easement agreement and the guidelines set forth in the Indian
Right of Way Act (IRWA). Further, the court must resolve any
ambiguities in the IRWA, the ICCTA, and the treaty granting the
Swinomish Tribe its reservation in favor of the Tribe. Part III of
this article will argue that the BIA has the authority under IRWA
to promulgate the new right-of-way regulations from 2015.
However, those challenging the new regulations should pay
attention to the outcome in this case, for it has the potential to
influence any future challenge to the new regulations.
Although this is seemingly a unique case, all tribes should heed
the lessons learned by the Swinomish Tribe on how to negotiate all
types of easements with private companies. If the easement
negotiated under IRWA preempts the STB, the lessons for tribes
are clear: in negotiating with private companies, tribes should: 1)
expressly control and manage the action taking place on the tribal
easement; 2) include a strict expiration date; and 3) include a
provision which states that the ICCTA preemption provisions do
not apply. If the STB preempts the contractual agreement between
BNSF and the Tribe, tribes across the country should refrain from
granting easements that impact interstate transportation–even if the
tribe might otherwise be willing to do so if certain conditions are
15

Id. at 17.
Id. at 9.
17
Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, at 5, Swinomish
Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., (W.D. Wash. Jun. 8, 2017), (No. 2:15-cv00543RSL) 2017 WL 132448.
18
Id.
16
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included in the contract–if tribal enforcement of those conditions
attempt to regulate what can be shipped, pumped, or transported in
any way. In this case, those conditions may be null and void, and
the tribe could be giving up control over such rights-of-way
indefinitely.
I.

PART I: FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

The 1855 Treaty of Point Elliott reserved the Swinomish
Reservation for the Tribe’s “exclusive use;” the land is held by the
United States in trust for the Tribe.19 Around 1889, the Seattle and
Northern Railroad Company (SNRC), a predecessor to BNSF,
began constructing a rail line through the reservation. 20 The
Secretary of the Interior at the time informed the SNRC that a
treaty or congressional legislation was necessary to create a rightof-way, but SNRC built tracks through reservation land without the
permission of the Tribe or the federal government anyway.21 The
United States government took no action against SNRC.22
The Burlington Northern Railroad Company (BN) (the
successor to SNRC) applied for a right-of-way with the BIA on
September 27, 1977. The Tribe objected, and the application was
subsequently denied by the superintendent of the BIA’s Western
Washington Agency on October 17, 1978.23 BN appealed to the
BIA Area Director and to the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs
of the Department of the Interior, who both affirmed the
superintendent.24 BN then brought the complaint to federal court in
Burlington Northern v. Andrus. 25 The district court stayed its
ruling until an opinion in Watt, a separate case out of the Ninth
Circuit, was issued.26 The Watt Court held that BIA’s construction
of the Act of March 2, 1899 to require tribal permission before a
right-of-way could be granted across tribal land was reasonable.27
Although the Act of March 2, 1899 did not specifically require
19

Treaty of Point Elliott, art. 2, 12 Stat. 927 (1855).
Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 3.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Swinomish Indian Tribal
Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., (W.D. Wash. July 21, 2016) (No. 2:15-cv-00543).
24
Id.
25
Id. at 5.
26
Id.; see also Rights-of-Way over Indian Land, 25 C.F.R. § 169.3 (2016); Nev.
Pub. Power Dist. v. 100.95 Acres of Land, 719 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1983).
27
S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Watt, 700 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 1983).
20
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tribal permission, it directed the Secretary to “make all needful
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with sections 312-318 of this
title, for the proper execution and carrying into effect of all the
provisions of said sections.” 28 The 1948 General Rights-of-Way
Act did require tribal permission;29 the court noted that both Acts
“pertain to rights-of-way across Indian lands and share a common
purpose: the preservation and protection of Indian interests.” 30
Subsequently, summary judgment was entered against Burlington
Northern in Andrus.31
A. The Settlement Agreement
All the while, in separate litigation, the Tribe pressured the
federal government to act to prevent BN from trespassing on tribal
land. The Tribe brought a trespass action against BN in 1978. 32
Although the litigation surrounding the trespass suit went on for
over a decade, it was ultimately settled in 1990.33 The Settlement
Agreement executed on July 19, 1991 formally granted permission
to BN to use the rail line.34 However, that permission was qualified
with certain conditions:
Burlington Northern agrees that,
unless otherwise agreed in writing,
only one eastern bound train, and
one western bound train, (of twentyfive (25) cars or less) shall cross the
reservation each day. The number of
trains and cars shall not be increased
unless required by shipper needs.
The Tribe agrees not to arbitrarily
withhold permission to increase the
number of trains or cars when
28

Act of March 2, 1899, ch. 374, 30 Stat. 990 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 312-318
(1976)).
29
1948 General Rights-of-Way Act, Pub.L. No. 80-407, 62 Stat. 17 (codified
in 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328 (1976)). (“No grant of a right-of-way over and across
any tribal lands... shall be granted without the consent of the proper tribal
officials”).
30
Watt, 700 F.2d at 554.
31
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 23, at 5-6.
32
Swinomish Tribal Community v. Burlington Northern, Inc., No. C78-429V
(W.D. Wash. filed July 18, 1978).
33
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 6.
34
Right-of-Way Easement, supra note 2, at 14.
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necessary to meet shipper needs. It is
understood and agreed that if the
number of crossings or the number
of cars is increased, the annual rental
will be subject to adjustment in
accordance with paragraph 3(b)iii of
this Right-of-Way Easement and
paragraph 2(b)iii of the Settlement
Agreement.35
The Agreement also grants BN a 40-year right-of-way
easement with two twenty-year options to BN. 36 The
Interior Department approved the easement on November
27, 1990.37
B. The Dangers of Transporting Crude Oil by Rail
The Tribe argues that it can reasonably deny BNSF permission
to run six 100-car unit trains per week in each direction because of
the inherent dangers associated with transporting crude oil and the
proximity of the rail line to critical cultural practices, such as
fishing, and economic infrastructure, such as the Swinomish
Casino and Lodge. The United States has concluded that the
transportation of Bakken crude by train is “unique[ly]
hazardous.”38 Derailment is more likely to occur when transporting
crude oil because “[t]he trains are longer, heavier in total, more
challenging to control, and can produce considerably higher buff
and draft forces which affect train stability.”39 Moreover, Bakken
35

Id. at 10.
Id. at 7.
37
Motion for Summary Judgment supra note 13, at 8.
38
Emergency Restriction/Prohibition Order (Order) by the United States
Department of Transportation (DOT) Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067 (May 7,
2014),
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Hazmat/Final
_EO_on_Transport_of_Bakken_Crude_Oi_05_07_2014.pdf.
39
PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN. AND FED. R.R. ADMIN.,
FRA & UNITED STATES PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION (PHMSA) REPORT, OPERATION SAFE DELIVERY UPDATE (July
23, 2014),
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Hazmat/07_2
3_14_Operation_Safe_Delivery_Report_final_clean.pdf. (“In addition, these
trains can be more challenging to slow down or stop, can be more prone to
derailments when put in emergency braking, and the loaded tank cars are stiffer
and do not react well to track warp which when combined with high buff/draft
forces can increase the risk of derailments.”).
36
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crude is more flammable than other types of crude oil.40 Serious
accidents involving trains carrying crude oil are common in the
United States and Canada and are increasingly likely to result in
“death... or substantial endangerment to health, property, or the
environment.”41
The following list of other accidents from around the country
illustrate the potential harm the Tribe would face if an accident
were to occur on its Reservation:
•

•

•

40

On March 7, 2015, a Canadian National Railway
train carrying crude oil derailed, damaging a bridge
over a waterway and dropping five cars into the
waterway.42
On March 5, 2015, a BNSF train carrying Bakken
crude derailed near Galena, Illinois. 43 Six cars
derailed and two ruptured and caught fire despite
being a newer model car known as the CPC-1232,
which was specifically and voluntarily adopted by
the industry to keep ruptures from occurring.44
On February 16, 2015, a train carrying Bakken
crude with CPC-1232 cars derailed 33 miles
southeast of Charleston, West Virginia, causing 20
cars to catch fire. Although the spill spared the
nearby Kanawha River, the explosion and fire
destroyed a home and caused the evacuation of two
towns nearby.45

Id. (“[Bakken] crude has a higher gas content, higher vapor pressure, lower
flashpoint and boiling point and thus a higher degree of volatility than most
other crudes in the U. S., which correlates to increased ignitability and
inflammability. The Congressional Research Service has reported that the
properties of Bakken shale oil are highly variable, even within the same oil
field.”).
41
Id. (“The number and type of petroleum crude oil railroad accidents described
below that have occurred during the last year is startling... Releases of petroleum
crude oil, subsequent fires, and environmental damage resulting from such
releases represent an imminent hazard as defined by 49 U.S.C. 5102(5),
presenting a substantial likelihood that death, serious illness, severe personal
injury, or substantial endangerment to health, property, or the environment may
occur.”).
42
Jeffrey Hodgson, Canadian Nat'l Crude Train Derails in Ontario, on Fire,
Leaking, REUTERS (Mar 7, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/canada-uscanada-derailment-idCAKBN0M30M520150307 (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
43
BNSF: Oil Train Derailment Near Galena Involved Safer Tank Cars,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-galenatrain-derailment-20150305-story.html. (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
44
Id.
45
Edward McAllister, Derailed CSX Train in West Virginia Hauled NewerModel Tank Cars, REUTERS, (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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On July 24, 2014, a BNSF train carrying nearly 100
cars of crude oil derailed right in the heart of Seattle
despite being on new track and only going five
miles per hour. Fortunately, no leakage occurred.46
On April 30, 2014, 15 cars on a train carrying
Bakken crude derailed in Lynchburg, Virginia,
resulting in a massive explosion and spilling up to
30,000 gallons of oil into the James River.47
On November 8, 2013, twenty-five cars derailed
near a trestle in rural Alabama sending flames high
into the sky that could be seen from 10 miles away.
Hundreds of thousands of gallons of oil spilled into
a wetland which eventually feeds into the
Tombigbee River.48
On December 30, 2013, a train carrying crude oil
collided with a derailed train carrying grain, causing
a “massive fireball” prompting the Federal Aviation
Administration to put flight restrictions in place
over the smoky area and residents from the nearby
town of Casselton to evacuate to Fargo.49
On July 6, 2013, a Montreal, Maine & Atlantic
Railway train shipping Bakken Crude in DOT-111
cars derailed in Lac-Megantic, Quebec. The
explosion and fire killed 47 people and destroyed
the downtown area of Lac-Megantic. In response,
Canada banned the DOT-111 cars from carrying oil,
requiring instead the use of TC-177’s which are
made of thicker steel.50

usa-train-derailment-csx-idUSKBN0LK1ST20150217 (last visited Mar. 10,
2017).
46
Lynda Mapes, Oil Train Derails in Interbay in Seattle, No Spills, SEATTLE
TIMES: THE TODAY FILE, (July 24, 2014: 5:44 AM),
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/today/2014/07/73125/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
47
Selam Gebrekiden, CSX Train Carrying Oil Derails in Virginia in Fiery Blast,
REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-railways-accidentvirginia-idUSBREA3T0YW20140430 (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
48
Verna Gates and Edward McAllister, Crude Oil Tank Cars Ablaze after Train
Derails in Alabama, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-crude-train-explosionidUSBRE9A70Q920131109 (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
49
Daniella Silva, Mile-long train carrying crude oil derails, explodes in North
Dakota, NBC NEWS (Dec 30, 2013),
http://usnews.newsvine.com/_news/2013/12/30/22113442-mile-long-traincarrying-crude-oil-derails-explodes-in-north-dakota.
50
Giuseppe Valiante, DOT-111 Rail Cars That Burned In Lac-Megantic Banned
For Oil Use, HUFFINGTON POST, July 25, 2016,
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/07/25/garneau-confirms-dot-111-cars-won-tbe-able-to-transport-crude-oil-as-of-nov-1_n_11183574.html.
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C. The Common-Carrier Obligation
BNSF argued it is obligated by the STB—formerly the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)—to transport as much
cargo as it is asked to, as long as that amount is reasonable. This is
the common-carrier obligation. The history of the common-carrier
obligation extends back centuries to a time before railroads even
existed.51 The fundamental idea was that no customer able to make
payment and making a reasonable request for a service offered to
the public at large could be denied. 52 Some researchers have
observed that the rules governing common carriers gradually arose
from the need to mitigate the dangers of monopolization and to
maximize overall economic efficiency.53 In 1701, an English court
found that:
If a man takes upon him a public
employment, he is bound to serve the
public as far as the employment
extends; and for refusal an action
lies, as against a farrier refusing to
shoe a horse, against an innkeeper
refusing a guest when he has room,
against a carrier refusing to carry
goods when he has convenience, his
wagon not being full.54
In return for this reduced discretion, a common carrier often
received certain benefits, such as limited liability.55
These common-law concepts are firmly established in
American statutes and jurisprudence. In 1901, the United States
Supreme Court held that a telegraph company is a common carrier,
and as such, is “performing a public service” to which “all
51

Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common
Carriage, 18 TELECOMM. POL'Y 435, Sec. II (1994).
52
Id.
53
See e.g., Harry M. Trebing, Common Carrier Regulation--The Silent Crisis,
34 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 306-07 (1969); see also Guido Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 507
(1961).
54
Lane v. Cotton, 1Ld.Raym. 646, 654 (1701, per C.J. Holt).
55
Eli M. Noam, supra note 51, at Sec. II.
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individuals have equal rights both in respect to service and
charges.” 56 The United States government also codified many
common-law concepts. For example, the Interstate Commerce Act
of 1887 (ICA) set out the duties of common carriers and many
rules by which they must abide.57 Today, “[a] rail carrier providing
transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Board
under this part shall provide the transportation or service on
reasonable request.”58 “Commitments which deprive a carrier of its
ability to respond to reasonable requests for common carrier
service are not reasonable.”59
D. The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act
(ICCTA)
Prior to the ICCTA, the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) regulated interstate commerce, including trucking, bus lines,
and telephone companies.60 When Congress passed the Interstate
Commerce Act (ICA) and created the ICC, its purpose was to
achieve by administrative control, a “proper relationship between
railway corporations and the general public,” one that “consist[ed]
... just and fair standards ... to make specific orders as to rates and
service and to enforce prompt obedience to these orders.”61 At the
end of the 19th century, modern production depended on railway
transportation. 62 Uniform regulation was needed in order to
prevent “monopolistic industrial combinations,” which led to
“railway discrimination in rates and service for the benefit of one
person, locality, or kind of traffic. This, in turn, prejudiced and

56

W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92, 99–100 (1901).
Pub. L. 95-473 and Pub. L. 97-449 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C Title VI
§ 6018, Dec. 18, 1991).
58
49 U.S.C § 11101(a) (2015).
59
Id.
60
49 U.S.C. §§ 10301-10311 (1994) (repealed 1995); See generally Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-2205 (1994) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§
101-80504 (2012)) [hereinafter ICA]; See also Mark F. Kightlinger, Nihilism
with a Happy Ending? The Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Emergence of the Post-Enlightenment Paradigm, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 113, 136
(2008).
61
ISIAH LEO SHARFMAN, REGULATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNDERLYING
PROBLEM IN RAILWAY ECONOMICS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GOVERNMENT
REGULATION, 191-92 (LaSalle Extension University, 1st ed. 1915).
62
Id. at 6.
57
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disadvantaged rival shippers, places, and industries.” 63 In
upholding the authority of the ICC (over the States) to fix rates, the
Supreme Court noted that “interstate carriers [were] instruments of
interstate commerce,” and Congress had “the right to control their
operations in all matters having such a close and substantial
relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or
appropriate to the security of that traffic [and] to the efficiency of
the interstate service...”64
In 1999, Congress granted exclusive authority over all rail
transportation in the United States to the Surface Transportation
Board when it passed the ICCTA. 65 In addition to the common
carrier requirement, the ICCTA described the Board’s jurisdiction
as follows:
The jurisdiction of the Board over—
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies
provided in this part with respect to rates,
classifications, rules (including car service,
interchange, and other operating rules), practices,
routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation,
abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial,
team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if
the tracks are located, or intended to be located,
entirely in one State,
is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this
part, the remedies provided under this part with
respect to regulation of rail transportation are
exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under
Federal or State law.66
With such broad language, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a broader
statement of Congress’s intent to preempt state regulatory authority
over railroad operations.”67

63

Id. at 23; see also Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate
Commerce Commission: The Tortuous Path from Regulation to Deregulation of
America's Infrastructure, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2012).
64
Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914).
65
ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, §§ 101-106, 109 Stat. 803,
804 (1995) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 101-727 1995)).
66
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2015).
67
City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, 154 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 944 F. Supp. 1573,
1581 (N.D. Ga 1996)).
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E. The Indian Right of Way Act (IRWA) and the Regulations
Promulgated Thereunder68
Regulation and control of tribal land by Congress has an erratic
and contradictory history. Inevitably, westward expansion and
tribal territories came into serious conflict with the addition of
Texas to the Union and the Californian Gold Rush; consequently,
the federal government began to create reservations for Indians in
the late 1840s.69 In 1854, Commissioner of Indian Affairs George
W. Manypenny argued it would be necessary “at no distant day, to
restrict the limits of all the Indian tribes upon our frontiers, and
cause them to be settled in fixed permanent localities, thereafter
not to be disturbed.”70 By 1872, the attitude that tribes would not
be disturbed was replaced by the idea that Indians should
eventually abandon their nomadic and communal reservations and
assimilate into popular society. 71 Acting on this belief, Congress
passed the Dawes Act, or General Allotment Act of 1887.72 The
Dawes Act authorized the president to allot reservation land to
Indians and open any remaining land to non-Indian settlement.
Around 1900, Congress passed legislation which formed a
“comprehensive scheme which completely covers the subject of
rights of way” and began to grant rights-of-way across reservation
land.73
The IRWA empowers the Secretary of the Interior to “grant
rights-of-way for all purposes, subject to such conditions as he
may prescribe, over and across any [tribal lands...” 74 Those who
are granted rights-of-way “shall comply with the provisions of
sections 312 to 318 of this title and such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed thereunder.”75 The purpose of this scheme was
68

Compare 25 U.S.C §§323-28 (2015) with 25 C.F.R. Pt. 169 (2017).
FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 58-59, 63 (2012 ed.)
(Indian tribes often ceded large swathes of land in exchange for retaining control
over a small portion of the land).
70
Comm’r Ind. Aff., Ann. Rep., S. Exec. Doc. No. 33-1, at 225 (1854).
71
COHEN, supra note 69, at 61.
72
Indian General Allotment Act, Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. (2015)).
73
Paul E. Frye, Section 1813 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005: Implications for
Tribal Sovereignty and Self-Sufficiency, 42 TULSA L. REV. 75, 75 (2006)
(quoting Plains Elec. Generating & Transmission Coop. v. Pueblo of Laguna,
542 F.2d 1375, 1380 (10th Cir. 1976).
74
25. U.S.C § 323 (2013).
75
25 U.S.C § 312 (2012). Congress passed Sections 311 to 321, which
concerned rights-of-way for specific purposes circa 1990. Congress enacted
69
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to protect Indian Nations “against improvident grants of rights-ofway”76 and to “fully... protect Indian interests.”77
F. An Overview of the Legal Arguments
At a cursory glance, it might seem like BNSF has clearly
violated a valid contract, but it is far more complicated than that.
At the heart of the conflict is—as it has been for the last century—
the extent of tribal sovereignty. On the one hand, BNSF argued
that the ICCTA preempts the part of the Agreement which—in its
view—unreasonably limits commerce because federal authority to
regulate railroads is exclusive. The STB, then, as the agency
responsible for following the mandate of the ICCTA, is in the best
position to “determine whether the relief requested by the tribe
would impermissibly conflict with the statutes and regulations
governing rail obligations, and if so, how the conflict should be
resolved.”78
On the other hand, the Tribe believes that the increase in crude
oil passing through the Reservation presents a danger to people,
recreation, and the environment. The railroad passes very close to
the Swinomish Casino and Lodge, a Chevron station, an RV park,
a Tribal waste treatment plant, and a Tribal air quality monitoring
facility, all of which are part of the hub of commerce and culture
on the Reservation.79 Hundreds of people are present at any given
time at these facilities.80 The right-of-way also passes over Padilla
Bay and the Swinomish Channel, which connect to the Puget
Sound where the Tribe has its “usual and accustomed fishing
grounds.” 81 Since time immemorial, the Puget Sound has
supported the fishing lifestyle of Northwest tribes, “and other

Sections 323 to 328 in 1948 to provide rights-of-way for all purposes. Congress
did not include the requirement that Tribes consent to the right-of-way until
1948. The Supreme Court interpreted the consent provision in the 1948 General
Rights-of-Way Act to apply to Sections 311 to 321. See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v.
Watt, 700 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 1983).
76
Loring v. United States, 610 F.2d 649, 651 (9th Cir. 1979).
77
S.P. Transp. Co. v. Watt, 700 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1983).
78
Defendant BNSF Railway Company’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay, at 11-12,
Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., (No. C15-543RSL) (W.D.
Wash. May 14, 2015), 2017 WL 132448.
79
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 23, at 2.
80
Id.
81
United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1049 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
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marine resources have played central and enduring roles in the
Tribe’s subsistence, culture, identity, and economy.”82
The Tribe argued that the Indian Right-of-Way Act of 1948
(IRWA), under which the Department of Interior granted the
easement, is integral to any decision the court makes because it
governs how the BIA grants easements and when the easements
may be revoked. 83 Because the IRWA applies, the court must
consider whether the IRWA and the ICCTA are in conflict. The
Tribe argues the two statutes can be read to function harmoniously
because they have obviously unrelated purposes. 84 Lastly, the
Tribe argues that both statutes must be interpreted liberally in favor
of tribal rights, and consistent with the Indian law canons of
construction.85
BNSF responds by arguing that the Tribe’s withholding of
consent to additional railcars passing through the Reservation is
contrary to federal law both because the contract between the Tribe
and BNSF is preempted by the ICCTA and because it is contrary to
other federal laws.86

II.

PART II. THE TRIBE IS NOT ARBITRARILY WITHHOLDING ITS
CONSENT TO AN INCREASE IN TRAIN TRAFFIC

BNSF argued that the tribe cannot withhold consent to an
increase in train traffic because this would violate federal law, and
the IRWA could not have sanctioned a contract which would
violate federal law.87 If true, this would also violate the Settlement
Agreement on its face because “nothing” in the easement “shall
supersede any federal law or regulation.” 88 In support of the
argument that the agreement violates federal law, BNSF makes
two points: first, the common-carrier obligation requires BNSF to
82

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 23, at 3.
Id. at 14-15.
84
Id. at 19.
85
Id. at 21-22.
86
BNSF Railway Company’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 12, Swinomish
Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C15-543RSL (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13,
2017), 2017 WL 132448.
87
25 C.F.R. § 169.9 (2015) (Rights-of-Way “(a) [a]re subject to all applicable
Federal laws; and (b) [a]re subject to tribal law; except to the extent that those
tribal laws are inconsistent with Federal law”).
88
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 23, at 7.
83
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provide transportation of crude oil; second, withholding consent
violates the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (hereinafter
Hazmat Act).89 Instead of addressing these arguments head on, the
Tribe argues that “[e]ven the STB does not read the [ICCTA]
federal preemption provision literally.”90
A.
Withholding Consent is Not Arbitrary; Whether the
Agreement Violates the Hazmat Act or the Common Carrier
Obligation is Not Dispositive
For the Tribe, the notion of “arbitrariness,” as derived from the
settlement agreement, should not be based on an understanding of
the practicality and the necessity of uniform regulatory practices;
rather, it should be based on its objection to a significant increase
of dangerous cargo passing through critical areas of the
Reservation. Nothing in BNSF’s briefing attempts to rebut the
Tribe’s assertion that oil traffic threatens harm to people and
sacred hunting grounds, or attempts to controvert the
reasonableness of the Tribe’s objection to increased crude oil
traffic. Instead, BNSF argues that it is per se unreasonable for the
Tribe to object to the increased traffic because states are prevented
from doing so, and because the federal government sufficiently
regulates the transportation of hazardous materials to keep
localities safe.
Nothing in the Hazmat Act expressly prevents the Tribe from
contracting with BNSF in such a way as to limit the number of oil
trains running through the Reservation. The Hazmat Act is an
extensive and comprehensive regulatory scheme designed to
regulate the transportation of hazardous material. It states:
“[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (e) of this section
and unless authorized by another law of the United States, a
requirement of a state... or a[n]... Indian tribe about [the
transportation of hazardous material] ... is preempted.” 91 The
Eighth Circuit has interpreted the Hazmat Act to prevent the
Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community from
implementing an ordinance requiring transporters of nuclear
materials travelling across reservation land to obtain a tribal
89

49 U.S.C.App. §§ 5108-5128 (2013).
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 16.
91
49 U.S.C § 5125(1) (2013).
90
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license. 92 Like the ICCTA, however, nothing in the Hazmat Act
mentions—let alone prohibits—contracting with a transporter, like
BNSF, to limit the transportation of a hazardous material.
Furthermore, the Hazmat Act has yet to generate litigation in
which the parties claimed it conflicted with another federal statute.
Initially, in his order on cross-motions for summary judgment,
Judge Lasnik did not conclude that the Tribe’s withholding of
consent was arbitrary as a matter of law, but he agreed with
BNSF’s first argument that easement agreements cannot be used to
prevent the railroad from meeting its common carrier obligations.93
In 1948, the United States Supreme Court heard United States v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, a case in which the owner
of a segment of track contracted with a railroad for use of that
segment.94 Cleveland Union Stock Yards Company had attempted
to impose certain fees on the rail company’s use of a particular
track segment it used. The railroad companies balked at how high
the fees were and refused to deliver livestock to the meatpackers at
the other end of the spur, effectively excluding meat from the types
of product that could be transported on the spur.95 The Supreme
Court held that the ownership of the track segment in question
“does not vest [the landowner] with power to compel the railroads
to operate in a way which violates the Interstate Commerce Act.”96
Similarly, Judge Lasnik held that an injunction preventing the
transportation of crude oil through the reservation was not an
appropriate remedy because this “state law claim” would
“effectively require a common carrier to discriminate against a
particular type of cargo and/or a particular region” and “burden[]
interstate commerce.”97 This discrimination, he said, “goes to the
heart of the railroad’s operations as a carrier and flies in the face of
the anti-discrimination purposes for which the Interstate
Commerce Act was first enacted.98
92

Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian
Cmty., 991 F.2d 458, 462-63 (8th Cir. 1993).
93
Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 4.
94
United States v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 333 U.S. 169, 176-77 (1948).
95
Id. at 173-74.
96
Id. at 177-78.
97
Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 10.
98
Id. Judge Lasnik also concluded that “BNSF’s promises to disclose the cargo
it carries across the reservation, to seek the Tribe’s written agreement prior to
increasing the traffic over the rail line, and to pay an adjusted rental amount do
not constitute the regulation of transportation by rail carriers or involve the
abandonment or discontinuance of track.” Id. at 9.
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However, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company is “simply
inapposite because it involved state law claims; it did not involve
an Indian tribe seeking to protect its treaty protected property
interests under federal law.” 99 Judge Lasnik correctly recognized
this oversight and granted the Tribe’s motion for
reconsideration. 100 “Federal common law governs an action for
trespass on Indian lands,”101 and federal common law provides a
variety of causes of action to protect Indian lands, such as actions
for ejectment, accounting for profits, and damages.102 Just recently,
the Western District of Oklahoma issued a permanent injunction
ejecting the operator of a network of natural gas transmission
pipelines from Kiowa Tribal land, and because the judge found the
federal common law trespass claim. 103 Thus, Judge Lasnik was
correct to permit or exclude the Tribe’s federal common law
claims; those should move forward without the limitation of
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.
III.

PART III. THE ICCTA DOES NOT PREEMPT ENFORCEMENT
OF THIS CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT

As discussed above, BNSF argued that, because the IRWA
does not authorize an action which would violate federal law, the
court need not even consider whether the ICCTA preempts the
right-of-way agreement. Whether the ICCTA preempts the
enforcement of the right-of-way agreement is a separate and
important question. If the ICCTA preempts the contractual
agreement, the remedies provided by the IRWA are rendered moot,
and the principles of economic efficiency as understood by the
STB apply to conflicts over the termination or negotiation of a
right-of-way agreement.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, at 4, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty.
v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C15-543RSL (W.D. Wash. March 10, 2016), 2017 WL
132448.
100
Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 17, at 5.
101
United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing United
States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 28 F.3d 1544, 1549 n.8 (9th Cir.
1994)).
102
Pend Oreille, 28 F.3d at 1549 n.8.
103
Order, at 9-10, Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners, (W.D. Okla. Mar. 28,
2017), (No. 5:15-cv-01262-M).
99

571

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:308

A.
The ICCTA Does Not on its Face Preempt the Right-ofWay Agreement Simply Because the Agreement is a Contract
ICCTA’s mandate to the STB to regulate interstate
transportation is broad and sweeping, but is not absolute. First,
“[s]tate and local regulation is appropriate where it does not
interfere with rail operations. Localities retain their reserved police
powers to protect the public health and safety so long as their
actions do not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.” 104
Second, contracts are recognized as “voluntary agreements [that]
must be seen as reflecting the carrier's own determination and
admission that the agreements would not unreasonably interfere
with interstate commerce.” 105 If every contractual arrangement
between a rail carrier and another party was preempted, the parties’
exclusive recourse would be ICCTA remedies, but the ICCTA
does not include a general contract remedy. 106 The STB itself
follows these two limiting principles and often emphasizes that
courts are the proper place for resolving contract disputes. 107
However, in both cases, whether it is a local regulation or a
contractual arrangement, the validity and enforceability is limited
to the extent it unreasonably interferes with interstate commerce or
the common carrier’s obligations.108

104

Grafton & Upton R.R. Co., FD 35779, 2014 WL 292443, at *5 (S.T.B. Jan.
22, 2014).
105
The Twp. of Woodbridge, NJ, et al., 5 S.T.B. 336, 3 (2000).
106
PCS Phosphate Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212, 218-19 (4th Cir.
2009).
107
See, e.g., Id. at 220 (citing The N. Y., Susquehanna, & W. Ry. Corp.-Discontinuance of Service Exemption, No. AB-286 S.T.B. 1, 2 (2008) (rejecting
stay based on claim that NYS & W did not fulfill contract obligation to “operate
and maintain the [rail system] improvements” because “a court of competent
jurisdiction is the proper forum to resolve contractual disputes, not the Board”);
Saginaw Bay S. Ry. Co. –Acquisition & Operation Exemption, No. 34729
S.T.B. 1, 3, 2006 WL 1201791, at *2 (S.T.B. May 5, 2006) (“[W]hether SBS
should be responsible for maintaining or indemnifying that portion of the line is
a private contractual dispute subject to the terms of the agreement under which
CSXT has made the assignment ... contractual disputes such as this one are
properly for the courts to decide.”); see also 49 U.S.C. § 10709(c)(2) (2013)
(providing that contracts between rail carriers and shippers, which are not
subject to rate requirements of the ICCTA, must be enforced in state or federal
court).
108
Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 8.
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The ICCTA Could Preempt the Enforcement of the Rightof-Way but for the IRWA and the Canons of Construction

In this case, Judge Lasnik concluded in his order granting the
Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgement in Part and Denying it in
Part that he could not grant the Tribe’s requests for relief to the
extent they would unreasonably interfere with interstate
commerce.109 In the first case relied upon by the Tribe, Township
of Woodbridge v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, the STB denied
Consolidated Railroad’s motion to dismiss in a case where citizens
had sued to enjoin the railroad from idling its trains in the town.110
The Township and Consolidated entered into a contractual
relationship in which the Consolidated agreed to limit the idling of
trains between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. 111 The township then
sought reassurance from the STB that Consolidated could be held
to the agreement. 112 The STB ruled that Consolidated had not
shown that enforcement of the contract between the township and
Consolidated would unreasonably interfere with the railroad’s
operation.113 However, the court later pointed out that the railway
company is not precluded from attempting to demonstrate in the
future that enforcement of the contract may interfere with interstate
commerce.114 Similarly, in PCS Phosphate v. Norfolk Southern the
Fourth Circuit said that a deed obligating Norfolk Southern
Railroad to pay for the relocation of a portion of track was not
preempted because the obligation would not interfere with Norfolk
Southern’s ability to serve its existing customers.115 In these cases,
although the court held that the contractual agreements were not
preempted by the ICCTA, it did not disregard such a possibility.
The PCS Phosphate court emphasized that “[t]his is not to say that
a voluntary agreement could never constitute an ‘unreasonable
interference’ with rail transportation.”116 Rather, preemption turned
on the facts of each case.117
109

Id. at 10.
Woodbridge, 5 S.T.B. at 1.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 2.
115
PCS Phosphate Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212, 222 (4th Cir. 2009).
116
Id. at 221; see also R.R. Ventures—Aban. Exemption—Between
Youngstown, Ohio, & Darlington, Pa., in Mahoning & Columbiana Ctys., Ohio,
& Beaver Cty., Pa., AB 556 (Sub-No. 2X), slip op. at 3 (S.T.B. served Jan. 7,
110
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B.
Federal Courts Should Hold that the Plain Language of the
ICCTA Does Not Outweigh the Trust Responsibility Between the
Federal Government and Indian Tribes
Whether the ICCTA preemption provision prevails over a
different federal law governing Indian tribes when that law
conflicts with the ICCTA appears to be an issue of first impression.
Phosphate and Woodbridge do not involve a contract authorized
by a federal statute, the IRWA, and sanctioned by the BIA (in the
Department of the Interior). To be clear, state and local regulation
is preempted with few exceptions, 118 but the Tribe is correct to
point out that the “ICCTA has never been held” to preempt other
federal statutes.119 However, this is not because courts reject the
preemption provision of the ICCTA; rather, it is because “there has
never been a case in which another federal remedy was being used
to conflict directly with the STB’s exclusive regulation of rail
transportation.” 120 And, this case is not just about any federal
remedy, this case involves the trust doctrine, a sacred
responsibility which courts have respected for over a century.
1. Courts Have Held that the ICCTA Does Not Supersede Other
Federal Acts, But Such Circumstances are Limited and Did Not
Present Serious Conflicts; No Such Holding Has Had Significant
Economic Impacts
Courts have had limited opportunity to interpret how
preemption applies when the ICCTA and other federal statutes
cover the same topic or are in conflict. Most significantly, although
2000) (“While the Board encourages privately negotiated agreements, any
contractual restrictions that unreasonably interfere with common carrier
operations are deemed void as contrary to public policy.”), aff’d sub nom. R.R.
Ventures v. STB, 299 F.3d 523, 560-63 (6th Cir. 2002).
117
PCS Phosphate, 559 F.3d at 221.
118
Joint Petition for Declaratory Order, Boston & Maine Corp. & Town of Ayer,
MA, STB Fin. Docket No. 33971, WL 4586855, 500 S.T.B. 500, 5 (S.T.B.,
Apr.30, 2001). (“State and local regulation is permissible where it does not
interfere with interstate rail operations, and localities retain certain police
powers to protect public health and safety. For example, non-discriminatory
enforcement of state and local requirements such as building and electrical
codes generally are not preempted.”).
119
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 16.
120
BNSF Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note
86, at 27.
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the plain language of “section 10501(b) [of the ICCTA] might
suggest that it supersedes other federal law, the [Surface
Transportation] Board and the courts have rejected such an
interpretation as overbroad and unworkable.”121 In some instances,
the ICCTA does not preempt other federal acts. 122 In Tyrell, the
court attempted to harmonize section 10501(b) of the ICCTA with
the Federal Railway Safety Act (FRSA). It found that the mere
existence of the FRSA indicates Congress’s intent for the STB and
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to have different
mandates, and the history of coordination between the agencies
reflects that the FRA handled safety matters, and the STB handled
economic regulation and environmental impact assessments. 123
The importance of the case, however, was more about who had the
proper mandate, rather than parsing a conflict between two
statutes, such as the IRWA and the ICCTA.
Some local environmental zoning ordinances or land use
restrictions have been upheld in a few contexts, but these cases are
limited to when the local entity has another federal grant of power.
The STB concluded that Congress did not intend the ICCTA to
preempt the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Clean Water Act
(CWA), which both involve local governments, in permitting and
regulation.124 However, even when another federal agency grants
certain powers to a local entity, the STB could still argue that
regulation must not “interfere with interstate rail operations....”125
Courts will seek to determine this on an individual basis and
121

C.S.X. Trans., Inc.—Pet. for Decl. Order at 1, (S.T.B. Mar. 14, 2005) (No.
34662) 2005 WL 1024490.
122
See, e.g., Holland v. Delray Connecting R. Co., 311 F. Supp. 2d 744 (N.D.
Ind. 2004) (“ICCTA did not preempt Coal Act to extent it required railroad to
pay annual premiums to union health benefit plan”); see also BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Albany & E.R.R. Co. 741 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (D. Or. 2010) (ICCTA does not
preempt the Sherman Act); Boston and Maine Corp. and Town of Ayer,
MA, 500 S.T.B at 5. (“[N]othing in section 10501(b) is intended to interfere
with the role of state and local agencies in implementing Federal environmental
statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, the [Clean Water Act], and the [Safe Water
Drinking Act]”); and Tyrrell v. Norfolk S. Ry., 248 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.2001)
(“[T]he ICCTA and its legislative history contain no evidence that Congress
intended for the STB to supplant the FRA's [Federal Railroad Administration]
authority over rail safety. Rather, the agencies' complementary exercise of their
statutory authority accurately reflects Congress's intent for the ICCTA and
FRSA [Federal Railway Safety Act] to be construed in pari materia.”).
123
Tyrell, 248 F.3d at 523.
124
Borough of Riverdale Petition for Declaratory Order the N.Y. Susquehanna
& W. Ry. Corp., 4 S.T.B. 380, 5 (1999).
125
Id.
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whether the “statute or regulation is being applied in a
discriminatory manner or being used as a pretext for frustrating or
preventing a particular activity, in which case, the application of
the statute or regulation would be preempted.”126 For example, the
STB noted that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adoption
of local regulation of train emissions would be preempted.127 The
STB rarely abdicates such authority and certainly has never done
so when the contract or local regulation so limited interstate
commerce.
C.

When Two Federal Laws Seemingly Conflict, One Does
Not Normally Preempt the Other; Rather, Courts Try to
Harmonize Them; There is No Evidence Congress intended to
Abrogate the IRWA upon Enacting the ICCTA

The Tribe argues that, as the ICCTA preemption provision is
not workable, courts must attempt to harmonize the ICCTA and
the IRWA.128 Preemption of a federal law by another federal law
does not make sense in the context of the Supremacy Clause—both
laws have equal power. 129 So, when federal acts conflict, courts
attempt to harmonize the statutes or determine whether one act
impliedly repeals another.130 “[I]f two federal statutes are ‘capable
of coexistence,’ the statutes should be harmonized and each should
be regarded as effective unless there is a ‘positive repugnancy’ or
an ‘irreconcilable conflict’ between the laws.”131 In BNSF Railway
Company v. California State Board of Equalization, BNSF and
Union Pacific Railroad Company challenged a California law
which required the railroads to collect a fee for the State Board of
Equalization from the shippers of hazardous materials.132 The court
126

Joint Petition for Declaratory Order, Boston & Maine Corp. & Town of Ayer,
MA, 5 S.T.B 5080, 6 (2001); see also, Grafton & Upton R.R. Co.—Petition for
Declaratory Order, FD 35779, 2014 STB LEXIS 12, at *15 (S.T.B. Jan. 27,
2014) (“[F]ederal environmental law would be preempted if the “federal
environmental laws are being used to regulate rail operations”).
127
U.S. EPA—Pet. For Declaratory Order, F.D. No. 35803 (S.T.B. Dec. 30,
2014).
128
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 18.
129
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
130
Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2014).
131
Assn. of Am. Railroads v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 622 F.3d 1094
(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Town of Ayer, 500 S.T.B at 6, n.28); see also, Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
132
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, No. 16-cv-04311-RS, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149884, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2016)
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granted the railroads’ request for an injunction, reasoning that “it is
not for the state effectively to instruct that entity as to what must
be included in rail shipping charges.”133 In doing so, however, it
noted that the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA)
permits states to impose fair fees,134 and it is not the fact of a fee
that triggers preemption by the ICCTA, but rather the way in
which the fee was collected. The HMTA and the ICCTA could be
harmonized if the fee was placed “directly on shippers, or on
railroads themselves” and if it did not discriminate between
railroads and other modes of transportation.135
Similarly, the Sierra Club sued BNSF arguing that BNSF
violates the CWA every time coal is discharged from a train car
into waters of the United States because it has never obtained a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit. 136 The court denied the parties’ motions for summary
judgement because it believed issues of material fact remained
outstanding; it “postpone[d] its decision on the ICCTA preemption
issue until after a possible finding of liability at trial.” 137 The
parties settled out of court,138 but the briefing indicated BNSF did
not believe that the statutes could or should be harmonized. Rather,
BNSF argued that federal law cannot be harmonized with ICCTA
when it is “being used to regulate rail operations directly or being
applied in a discriminatory manner against railroads.”139

133

Id. at *11.
49 U.S.C. § 5125(f) (2013) ("A State, political subdivision of a State, or
Indian tribe may impose a fee related to transporting hazardous material only if
the fee is fair and used for a purpose related to transporting hazardous material,
including enforcement and planning, developing, and maintaining a capability
for emergency response.").
135
Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, No. 16-cv-04311-RS, at *10, *14.
136
Order Denying Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgment
at 1, Sierra Club v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C13-967-JCC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
147786, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 25, 2016).
137
Id. at 37.
138
Phuong Le, BNSF to Study Coal Covers Under Tentative Lawsuit Agreement,
THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 15, 2016, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/environment/enviros-bnsf-railway-reach-agreement-in-coal-dust-lawsuit/
(last visited Mar. 10, 2017) (“BNSF denied any violations of federal
environmental laws, but also agreed to pay $1 million in environmental projects
in the state and to clean up certain hotspots where coal has accumulated along
tracks near waterways.”)
139
BNSF Railway Company's Motion for Summary Judgment, Sierra Club v.
BNSF, 2016 WL 4721022 (W.D.Wash. Aug. 19, 2016) (Nos. 2:13-cv-00967JCC, 2:14-cv-00660) (citing In re EPA Petition, (S.T.B. Dec. 29, 2014) (No.
35803) 2014 WL 7392860.
134
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In this case, Judge Lasnik stated the issue is not whether the
ICCTA preempts IRWA, but rather “whether Congress intended to
repeal the Treaty of Point Elliott when it enacted the ICCTA.”140
Unlike California State Board of Equalization or Sierra Club v.
BNSF, this case involves the treaty right to exclude nonmembers. 141 Only an act of Congress or the Executive can
extinguish treaty rights, including the Treaty of Point Elliott, if
there is “clear evidence that Congress actually considered the
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian
treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty.” 142 “The intention to abrogate a treaty or
modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed by the Congress,”143
and Judge Lasnik found no evidence of such intent. 144 He
concluded that the ICCTA does not preempt or repeal the
Treaty.145
D.
The ICCTA and the IRWA Should Be Construed in Favor of
Indian Rights; Considering This, the ICCTA Cannot Preempt the
IRWA
Judge Lasnik found that the ICCTA did not preempt the
IRWA, and he did so in large part on the basis that there was no
evidence Congress intended to abrogate the treaty rights. The
canons of construction are critical in this analysis as they apply to
treaty rights and they may apply to the interpretation of statutes.
Like the CWA, the IRWA is a federal statute granting federal
agencies the right to issue administrative rules governing the
granting of rights-of-way on tribal land. Given the extent of federal
control, trust responsibilities apply to the granting of rights-ofway,146 as do the classic canons of construction, instructing courts

Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 17, at 3.
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986). The right to exclude nonmembers from the reservation is “too fundamental to be easily cast aside.”
142
Id. at 739-40.
143
Cook v. U.S., 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933).
144
Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at
14; see also Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note
17, at 4.
145
Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at
16.
146
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 223-24, 225 n.29, 226 n.31 (1983)
(hereinafter Mitchell II).
140
141

2017]

Swinomish v. BNSF

578

to construe treaties and regulations liberally in favor of Indians.147
Given the trust doctrine and the canons of construction, BNSF
should be held to the express language of the contract. The court
could grant an injunction until the parties determine what amount
of traffic across the reservation is reasonable considering the
dangers of crude oil transportation.
The concepts of the trust responsibility and protection are
inherent in the very first treaties negotiated between Indians and
the United States Government. 148 John Marshall, the first Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, described the
Cherokee Nation as a “domestic dependent nation[]” 149 and
summarized the relationship between tribes and the United States
as “marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist
nowhere else.” 150 Congress codified this trust relationship in
several statutes. For example, the Northwest Ordinance, passed by
Congress in 1787 stated:
The utmost good faith shall always
be observed towards the Indians,
their lands and property shall never
be taken from them without their
consent; and in their property, rights
and liberty, they shall never be
invaded or disturbed . . . but laws
founded in justice and humanity
shall from time to time be made, for
preventing wrongs being done to
them, and for preserving peace and
friendship with them.151
Over the last century, the trust relationship has survived a variety
of permutations. The U.S. Supreme Court has both expanded and
then limited its influence. During the “Allotment Era,” in which
147

Star Lake R.R. v. Lujan, 737 F. Supp. 103, 109 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 925
F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
148
See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800, 124-37 (Oxford U. Press
1997).
149
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
150
Id. at 16.
151
See “An Ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States
Northwest of the river Ohio,” July 13, 1787 art. 3, in 32 Journals of the
Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 334, 341 (Worthington C. Ford et al., eds.
1904-37).
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Congress opened many reservations to non-Indian settlement, the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld Congress’s decision to both
unilaterally abrogate a treaty and apply federal criminal laws to
Indians. 152 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the guardian-ward
relationship was both the source and the justification for this
“plenary” power, 153 which Congress readily used to limit tribal
sovereignty.154
The canons of construction are as old as the trust relationship.
“The canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in
the unique trust relationship between the United States and the
Indians.”155 In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice John Marshall
interpreted the treaty between the Cherokee Tribe and the federal
government—the Treaty of Hopewell of 1785—as the “unlettered
people” would have understood it.156 The Treaty indicated that the
tribal lands were “allotted” to the Tribe, which, of course, had a
particular legal connotation. However, Marshall explained it was
highly unlikely the Cherokee Nation had understood that “instead
of granting, they were receiving lands.”157 “Therefore, he read the
term from the tribe's perspective, as merely establishing a ‘dividing
line between the two nations.’”158
The federal trust responsibility limits the power of the
executive branch of the federal government in three ways. First,

152

Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903) (holding Congress did not
have to abide by the treaty requiring consent of three-fourths of adult male
members for any allotment of land to non-Indians because it would materially
limit and qualify the controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care and
protection of the Indians, and to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency, to
partition Indian land without consent); see also United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (upholding the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act,
which inter alia gave federal courts jurisdiction of some crimes committed on
reservation land even between Indians).
153
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
154
See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (quoting Kagama
to uphold statute making it a crime to introduce liquor into Indian country); and
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902) (invoking political
question doctrine to upholding Congress’s ability to lease reservation land
without tribal consent); and Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 485
(1899) (quoting Kagama and invoking political question doctrine in upholding
Congress’s ability to determine membership in tribe).
155
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (quoting Oneida Cty.
v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985)).
156
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832) (McLean J., concurring).
157
Id. at 553 (Majority Opinion).
158
Jacob Schuman, Indian Canon Originalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1102
(2013) (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552).
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the “[general trust] represents the historical obligation of the
federal government to protect tribal lands and tribal selfgovernment.”159 This general trust also serves to restrain alienation
of Indian land and requires the Secretary of the Interior to approve
all leases on Indian land.160
Second, a general statute may give rise to obligations
enforceable by suit, but such “limited trust” does not permit
actions for damages.161 In Mitchell I, the Quinault Nation sued the
federal government under the General Allotment Act (GAA)
claiming mismanagement of its timber resources and the proceeds
from timber sales. 162 Although the language of section five of
GAA required the United States to hold land in trust for the Tribe,
the court held that section five created only a limited trust
relationship between the United States and the Tribe, and it did not
impose upon the federal government any duty to manage timber
resources.163
Third, when a statutory scheme contemplates “elaborate
control” over Indian land and resources, the United States may be
liable for damages under a theory of fiduciary responsibility. 164 In
Mitchell II, the Quinault Nation brought the same claim again, this
time, arguing that the timber management statutes and other
federal statutes established fiduciary obligations between the Tribe
and the federal government. 165 The court agreed, finding that a
fiduciary obligation existed that mandated the federal government
to compensate the Tribe for mismanagement or forest resources.166
The Tribe successfully used the trust doctrine to assert that the
federal government had a positive duty to Indians, and where that
duty was breached, the federal government could be sued for
damages.
Although the canons of construction and the trust relationship
are incredibly important to Indian law, the extent to which they
impact Indian law today is debatable. Modern jurisprudence does
159

Judith V. Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust
Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral Resources,
71 N.D. L. REV. 327 (1995).
160
Id. at 327-28.
161
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980) (hereinafter Mitchell I).
162
Id.
163
Id. at 542-53.
164
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1983).
165
Id. at 226.
166
Id.
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not explicitly apply the canons to federal statutes, particularly ones
of general applicability. The U.S. Supreme Court originally only
applied the canons to treaties, but in the early 1900’s, treaty
making ceased as Indian policy creation shifted from the Executive
Branch to Congress. 167 The Supreme Court expanded the canons
to apply to statutes affecting Indians without noting the
significance of the application. 168 The Nebraska District Court
explicitly noted that these statutes were in effect treaties and, thus,
should be interpreted and construed as though they were treaties.169
More modern jurisprudence is, in large part, consistent with this
principles. “[F]aced with . . . two possible [statutory] constructions,
our choice between them must be dictated by a principle deeply
rooted in [the Supreme] Court's Indian jurisprudence: ‘[s]tatutes
are to be construed liberally in favor of Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to their benefit.’”170 On the other hand, this
method of statutory interpretation seems only to apply to statutes
“enacted specifically for the benefit of Indians or for the regulation
of Indian affairs,” rather than statutes of general application.171
Moreover, courts sometimes “disregard[]” 172 the canons,
especially when there are significant countervailing considerations
or incongruous cannons. 173 Canons are not “mandatory rules” 174
and “need not be conclusive.” 175 Detractors also criticize the
canons for being “normative in a fuzzy, liberal”176 way and for the
difficulty of determining the tribe’s original understanding of a
167

Schuman, supra note 157, at 1103.
Id. See also Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90
B.U. L. REV. 109, 152 (2010).
169
Conway v. United States, 149 F.261, 265-66 (C.C.D. Neb. 1907).
170
Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766
(1985); see City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020, 1032 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (“ambiguities in federal statues are to be read liberally in favor of the
Indians”).
171
San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. N.L.R.B., 475 F.3d 1306, 1312 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
172
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 569 (1981) (Blackmun, J.
dissenting); see also David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis
and Dependent Indian Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L.
REV. 37 (1999) (noting that Justice Thomas did not mention the canons at all in
the Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie opinion).
173
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001).
174
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001).
175
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 115.
176
Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 381, 424 (1993).
168
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document.177 However, these criticisms of the trust doctrine are not
persuasive in this case.
If the trust relationship and the canons of construction are to
mean anything, when the BIA sanctions, permits, and approves
contractual provisions under IRWA—a statute enacted for the
benefit of Indians—those provisions should be interpreted
considering the Tribe’s interests and its original understanding of
the document. In Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed several treaties and
orders within the context of the canons of construction to assure
the Chippewa Indians of their fundamental hunting and fishing
rights.178 In so doing, the court emphasized that if Congress intends
to nullify treaty rights, it must do so explicitly.179 An 1837 treaty
between the Chippewa Bands of Indians ceded land to the United
States, which, in turn, guaranteed to them certain hunting, fishing,
and gathering rights. 180 President Taylor revoked the usufruct
rights in an Executive Order of 1850, but in the subsequent Treaty
of 1855, the Bands relinquished to the United States “any and all
right” to land within the Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere. The
1855 Treaty did not mention whether it modified any of the terms
from the original 1837 Treaty or hunting and fishing rights.181 In
this context, the court concluded that the Treaty was ambiguous
and resolved the tension “in favor of the Indians.” 182 The
Swinomish Tribe protected itself from potentially unlimited
violations of its tribal sovereignty, by including certain
“conditions” in the easement agreement as allowed for in
IRWA. 183 There is no limit on what conditions can be imposed.
Any ambiguity on what conditions may be imposed under IRWA
should be resolved in favor of the Tribe.
It would be manifestly unjust for the federal government and
the federal courts to invalidate a contract, and provisions therein,
which retained some of the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty. The
177

Schuman, supra note 157, at 1104.
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 188-93
(1999); see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (When Congress
amended the Bald Eagle Protection Act to extent the ban on golden eagle
hunting except by Indians with a permit it explicitly abrogated the treaty rights
of the Tribe).
179
Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 196.
180
Id. at 176.
181
Id. at 184.
182
Id. at 218 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
183
Easement Agreement, supra note 2.
178
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Swinomish Tribe lamented that without “the conditions contained
in the Easement Agreement,” or if it had known that “BN . . .
considered the terms of the [grant] to be subordinate to ICC or
common carrier obligations, [] the Tribe would never have granted
its consent.” 184 Even without a treaty protecting a right, “a
hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the power to exclude non-Indians
from Indian lands.”185 Tribes have authority “[t]o determine who
may enter the reservation; to define the conditions upon which they
may enter; to prescribe rules of conduct; [and] to expel those who
enter the reservation without proper authority.”186 With the treaty,
the Tribe has the “exclusive” use of the land. In summary, the
federal government would violate its trust responsibility by
approving a contract that did grant some sovereignty, and then
going back on its word to hold the portion of the contract in which
the Tribe retained sovereignty invalid. To hold that the ICCTA
preempts the agreement would amount to an unqualified injustice
to tribes.
Judge Lasnik properly considered the canons of construction in
his ruling.187 The purpose of IRWA is to protect Indians “against
improvident grants of rights-of-way”188 and to “fully . . . protect
Indian interests.”189 For the federal government to so thoroughly
reject a tenet of Indian sovereignty would completely undermine
the stated purpose of the IRWA. With the canons, the court can
prevent BNSF from using its common carrier obligations to dodge
its contractual obligations and continue to perpetuate a history of
Indian subjugation.
Despite this, Judge Lasnik initially found the injunction
remedy unavailable to the Tribe because it would “fly[] in the face
of the anti-discrimination purposes for which the Interstate
Commerce Act was first enacted.” If the ICCTA is preempted, it
should not then be used to justify the denial of an injunctive
remedy for the Tribe. Similarly, why should the Tribe seek a
declaration from the STB of its contractual rights if the ICCTA is

184

Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 7-8.
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982).
186
Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976).
187
Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at
12.
188
Loring v. United States, 610 F.2d 649, 651 (9th Cir. 1979).
189
S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Watt, 700 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1983).
185
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not preempted? 190 Ultimately, in granting the Tribe’s motion for
reconsideration, Judge Lasnik correctly limits Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Company to state law claims.191
Despite rejecting the applicability of the ICCTA, Judge Lasnik
did determine in the order on cross motions for summary judgment
that any conflict between the IRWA and the ICCTA is not
irreconcilable, but he fails to explain why this is so under the facts
of Swinomish v. BNSF.192 There is no doubt, BNSF will argue on
appeal that the conflict is irreconcilable. As the Tribe admits,
“[b]oth enactments have provisions applicable to railroads, even if
the policies behind those provisions are very different.” 193
Patchwork easements negotiated separately with different tribes
that may have different priorities and conditions will likely
frustrate the policy of the ICCTA—to prevent railroads from being
subject to “new and conflicting regulatory obligations that will
vary as a train travels across different jurisdictions.” 194 Judge
Lasnik notes that “between 1980 and 1995 the courts and the ICC
recognized the ‘primary responsibility and presumably greater
expertise of the Department of the Interior over tribal affairs.’”195
After the ICCTA was enacted, the STB continued to recognize the
BIA’s expertise and right to handle disputes between Tribes and
those entities that hold a right-of-way. 196 Judge Lasnik’s
conclusion that “BNSF has not shown that compliance with these
provisions would impose an unreasonable burden on interstate

190

Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at
18.
191
Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 17, at 2.
BNSF again points out that the ICCTA’s preemption provision applies to federal
and state law, but seemingly forgets the court has already rejected the
applicability of the ICCTA and the blanket preemption on remedies under
federal law. BNSF’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration at 3-4,
Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C15-543RSL (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 13, 2017), 2017 WL 132448.
192
Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at
14.
193
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 19.
194
Defendant BNSF Co.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Sierra Club v. BNSF
Railway Co., 2016 WL 4721022 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2016)
195
Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 15
(citing N.M. Navajo Ranchers Ass’n v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 702 F.2d
227, 232-33 (D.C Cir. 1983)).
196
See Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Alaska, Alaska R.R.
Construction and Operation of a Rail Line Extension to Port MacKensie, No.
35095, 2010 WL 1266781, at *562 (S.T.B. Mar. 16, 2010).
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commerce” 197 is untenable—there is an inevitable economic
conflict. Until now, it appears there has not been a significant
conflict, but to grant the Tribe’s injunction would have a
significant impact on BNSF’s common carrier obligations and
crude oil transportation to Cherry Point.
While this case is unique, if the ICCTA preempts the IRWA,
the new BIA right-of-way rules would be swallowed by the
ICCTA insofar as no tribe would be allowed to terminate a grant of
right-of-way. BNSF or another railroad would simply claim that
the agreement impeded its common carrier obligations. For such a
drastic unsettling of BIA administrative procedure, the Court
should require explicit intent from Congress, as it does when
Congress abrogates a treaty right.
IV.
PART IV: THE IRWA AND THE CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION
MUST PREEMPT THE ICCTA OR MUCH OF THE NEW RULES ON
RIGHTS-OF-WAY PROMULGATED BY THE BIA IN 2015 IS RENDERED
INEFFECTUAL
The validity of the BIA’s new regulations as they pertain to
railroads and other areas regulated by the STB is threatened if the
ICCTA preempts the IRWA in Swinomish v. BNSF or if the Tribe
is unable to hold BNSF accountable using federal remedies for its
continued violations of the right-of-way agreement. BIA’s
argument that it does have authority to promulgate the new rules is
relevant to the extent that it shows a clear grant of federal
administrative power that conflicts with the ICCTA. If the BIA has
authority to grant tribes the power to unilaterally terminate a rightof-way or to limit the range of use permitted under a right-of-way,
then holding that the ICCTA preempts the IRWA in Swinomish v.
BNSF does not merely threaten the BIA’s new rules—indeed,
some of the regulations may be void. On the other hand, if the BIA
has no authority to promulgate the new rules, the authority of the
STB and the BIA may not conflict. While the new regulations are
probably in keeping with federal law, they will likely be tested in
federal court because it is not sufficiently clear what provisions in
a right-of-way agreement would violate federal law and what
would not. A court trying to determine if a provision in a right-ofway agreement violated federal law would have to consider
197

Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 9.
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whether the provision granted a tribe civil or criminal jurisdiction
in violation of existing federal law.
On March 11, 2016, the Western Energy Alliance (Alliance)198
sued the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the BIA in the
United States District Court for the District of North Dakota
seeking injunctive relief and to block new rules regarding rightsof-way on tribal land.199 The Alliance mounted a facial challenge
to the new rule arguing that it exceeded the authority of the
Secretary of the DOI because, inter alia, tribes cannot unilaterally
terminate a right-of-way or regulate the conduct of non-Indians on
federally granted rights-of-way.200 The complaint did not mention
common carrier obligations or the ICCTA. The district court held
that the Alliance failed to show that, on balance, the court should
grant an injunction.201 This ruling doesn’t end litigation on the new
rules; it only means that Alliance must now show “concrete and
particularized harm” because of the new rules as required by the
United States Supreme Court standing jurisprudence.202
The BIA last made material modifications to the right-ofway regulations in 1968 and has now updated many of the
outdated aspects of the old rules.203 One of the significant changes
to the new regulations promulgated by the BIA allows for the tribe
to unilaterally terminate those rights-of-way granted after
implementation of these rules.204 The new regulations require the
Secretary’s grant of any right-of-way to clarify that it does not
diminish to any extent:
198

The Alliance: Who We Are, WESTERN ENERGY ALLIANCE,
https://www.westernenergyalliance.org/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). The
Alliance is an “alliance of stakeholders” who “represent the voice of the
Western oil and natural gas industry in a variety of ways.”
199
Complaint, Western Energy Alliance v. United States Dep’t of the Interior,
(March 11, 2016) (16-cv-00050-DLH-CSM).
200
Id. at 4.
201
Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 15, Western
Energy Alliance v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 16-cv-00050-DLH-CSM
(April 19, 2016); See Dataphase Systems, Inc., v. C L Systems Inc., 640 F.2d
109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981).
202
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See Lujan v. Def. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992).
203
Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 4, Western
Energy Alliance v. United States Department of the Interior, No. 16-cv-00050DLH-CSM, (March 30, 2016). The new rules are promulgated at: Rights-ofWay on Indian Land, 80 Fed. Reg. 72492-72549 (Nov. 19, 2015).
204
Rights of Way on Indian land, 25 C.F.R. § 169.403(a) (2015) (A grantee and
a tribe can negotiate remedies that may “provide one or both parties with the
power to terminate the grant...”).
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(a) The Indian tribe's jurisdiction over the land
subject to, and any person or activity within, the
right-of-way;
(b) The power of the Indian tribe to tax the land,
any improvements on the land, or any person or
activity within, the right-of-way;
(c) The Indian tribe's authority to enforce tribal law
of general or particular application on the land
subject to and within the right-of-way, as if there
were no grant of right-of-way;
(d) The Indian tribe's inherent sovereign power to
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-members on
Indian land; or
(e) The character of the land subject to the right-ofway as Indian country under 18 U.S.C. 1151.205
The new rules also emphasize that right-of-way grants “[a]re
subject to all applicable federal laws” and tribal law “except to the
extent that those tribal laws are inconsistent with applicable federal
law.”206
In fact, the STB claims complete control of the termination of
railroad rights-of-way. The ICCTA, which grants the STB
exclusive jurisdiction over the “construction, acquisition,
operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial,
team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities,” 207 is in direct
opposition to the current rules promulgated under IRWA. The
2015 rules state:
Any abandonment, non-use, or violation of the
right-of-way grant or right-of-way document,
including but not limited to encroachments beyond
the defined boundaries, accidental, willful, and/or
incidental trespass, unauthorized new construction,
changes in use not permitted in the grant, and late or
insufficient payment may result in enforcement
actions including, but not limited to, cancellation of
the grant [by BIA in consultation with the tribe].208
205

Rights of Way on Indian Land, 25 C.F.R. §169.010 (2015). (A grantee and a
tribe can negotiate remedies that may “provide one or both parties with the
power to terminate the grant…”).
206
Id. §169.009.
207
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2) (2013).
208
25 C.F.R. §169.401 (2015).
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In addition, §169.403 allows for the tribe and the grantee to
negotiate a termination provision that would execute in the case of
a violation of the agreement without the permission of the BIA or
any other federal agency.209
These provisions are not precisely at issue in Swinomish v.
BNSF because the Tribe is not seeking termination of the right-ofway, but, if it were, BNSF noted in its cross-motion for Summary
Judgement that such action as it pertained to railroads would again
be preempted by the ICCTA.210 The Tribe is also concerned that
the expiration of the Easement Agreement no later than 2071
would be seen by BNSF as an “impermissible interference with its
common carrier obligations and would be preempted by the
ICCTA.”211 Indeed, counsel for BNSF did not object to the court’s
observation at the motion to dismiss hearing that “you’re not going
to abide by the termination agreement in the lease either.”212
A.

The BIA Has Authority to Grant Rights-of-Way with
Conditions

In its suit against the BIA, Western Energy Alliance argued
that the new rules expand tribal jurisdiction in violation of federal
law. While the BIA can certainly attach provisions to any grant,213

209

25 C.F.R. §169.403 (2015). The previous iteration of the right-of-way rules,
which also is arguably in conflict with the ICCTA states: “[a]ll rights-of-way
granted under the regulations in this part may be terminated in whole or in part
upon 30 days written notice from the Secretary mailed to the grantee at its latest
address furnished in accordance with §169.5(j) for any of the following causes:
(a) Failure to comply with any term or condition of the grant or the applicable
regulations; (b) A nonuse of the right-of-way for a consecutive 2-year period for
the purpose for which it was granted; (c) An abandonment of the right-of-way. If
within the 30-day notice period the grantee fails to correct the basis for
termination, the Secretary shall issue an appropriate instrument terminating the
right-of-way.” 25 C.F.R. § 169.20(a) (2012).
210
Cross-Motion and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgement,
supra note 86, at 24, n28.
211
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 13; Chicago & N.W. Tr.
Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318 (1981) (ICC abandonment
authority is plenary and exclusive); Transit Comm’n v. United States, 289 U.S.
121 (1933) (ICC authority is exclusive for constructions of railroads).
212
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 13.
213
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, PROCEDURAL HANDBOOK: GRANTS OF
EASEMENT FOR RIGHT OF WAY ON INDIAN LANDS, § 1.2 (2006) (“The [right-ofway] creates a non-possessory interest in the land which is a right to use or the
right to restrict use of the property for a particular purpose. A ‘grant of easement’
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the Alliance argues the rules go too far and “bestow jurisdiction
over non-Indians.” 214 For example, the Alliance argues that the
new rules restrict grantees’ property rights by requiring Tribal
permission to assign the property both prospectively and
retrospectively if the contract is silent as to assignment.215 On the
contrary, “[r]ights-of-way are typically easements that do not
convey fee title and may be limited to a specific use or purpose.”216
Assignment is not an absolute right that is concomitant with rightsof-way; rather, it is subject to contractual negotiation just as it
would in a commercial lease.
The Alliance further objects that 169.405(d), which covers
remedies available for existing grants, would lead to unilateral
termination of right-of-way grants in tribal court. It states: “[BIA]
may invoke any other remedies available to us under the grant,
including collecting on any available bond, and the Indian
landowners may pursue any available remedies under tribal
law.”217 Despite the Alliance’s concerns, it is not likely to be an
available remedy because unilateral termination only applies
prospectively.
Any provision in a right-of-way agreement which either allows
for unilateral termination or otherwise limits the activity of the
grantee must not precluded by federal law. The criminal, civil, and
regulatory jurisdiction of a tribe is a convoluted analysis and
depends on whether an incident occurs on fee land—whether it be
owned by a tribal member or a non-tribal member—or land held in
trust. A right-of-way agreement might be considered a
“regulation.” The Supreme Court has limited the civil regulatory
jurisdiction of tribes over non-Indians on non-Indian-owned fee
land. 218 Absent a specific federal statute or treaty, tribes

for [a right-of-way] defines the type, extent, use, purpose, width, length, and
duration of the [right-of-way].”).
214
Complaint, supra note 198, at 6.
215
Id. at 5. See also Right-of-Way on Indian Land, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,492, 72,545
(Nov. 19, 2014).
216
United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d 670, 676 (8th Cir. 2012).
217
Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, Western Energy
Alliance v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 16-cv-00050-DLH-CSM, (April
4, 2016) (emphasis added).
218
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, Western
Energy Alliance v. D.O.I, 16-cv-00050-DLH-CSM (W.D. N.D. Apr. 4, 2016)
(Fee land is that land owned in fee simple by Indians or non-Indians. Trust land
is that land which is held in trust by the federal government. Except in Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), the “United States Supreme Court has not applied
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presumptively do not retain civil regulatory jurisdiction over nonIndians on non-Indian owned fee land within the reservation power
except in two instances:
Indian
tribes
retain
inherent
sovereign power to exercise some
forms of civil jurisdiction over nonIndians on their reservations, even on
non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing,
or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its
members,
through
commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements. A tribe may also
retain inherent power to exercise
civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe.219
While phrased quite broadly, the Supreme Court tends to narrowly
construe these exceptions, known as the Montana exceptions,
particularly the second one. 220 Threatening conduct only applies
where the tribe may be in actual jeopardy, such as in an armed
takeover of a tribe’s casino and government center by security
guards, 221 or igniting forest fires. 222 In Montana, the Supreme
Court highlighted several cases which it considered to be represent

Montana to evaluate a tribe’s jurisdiction over nonmember conduct on trust or
restricted lands.”).
219
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981) (internal citations
omitted).
220
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
319 (2008) (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001)) (Except in
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 408 (1989), “this Court has never ‘upheld under Montana the extension of
tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land’”).
221
Attorney’s Process and Investigation Services v. Sac & Fox Tribe, 609 F.3d
927, 936 (8th Cir. 2010).
222
Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842, 849-50 (9th
Cir. 2009).
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consensual relationships in retail sales, permitting, and taxes. 223
Since Montana, however, courts often analyze whether to apply
the exceptions even in cases where the controversy arises from
trust land.
In Strate v. A1 Contractors, the court potentially expanded
Montana’s applicability by applying it to the grant of a right-ofway on trust land for a highway in North Dakota. In that case,
neither Montana exception applied when an Indian is involved in a
car accident on a right-of-way granted to the state with a car owned
by a non-Indian contracting with the Tribe for landscaping. 224
However, Strate did not say that all rights-of-way are fee land
subject to the Montana exceptions. Rather, land ownership “is only
one factor to consider” when evaluating whether Montana applies
regarding a tribe’s jurisdiction over nonmembers, although it “may
sometimes be a dispositive factor.”225 The Court limited Strate to
the “particular matter:” the lands were the equivalent of fee land
for tribal jurisdiction because the right-of-way was a state highway
and “subject to the State’s control, the “[t]ribes [] consented to, and
received payment for” the grant, and the Tribe “retained no
gatekeeping right” to allow it to “assert a landowner’s right to
occupy and exclude” nonmembers.226
When the case and controversy arises on land held in trust or
fee land owned by Indians and when there are minimal or no
competing state interests in play, courts find that Montana does not
apply.227 In Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area v. LaRance, the
Ninth Circuit held the tribe had jurisdiction over the company and
that the company’s owner operated a resort on rented tribal land.
The court reasoned that the tribe’s status as landowner is enough to
support regulatory jurisdiction without considering Montana

223

Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)
(holding that a non-Indian suit against an Indian shop owner to collect goods
sold to him on credit should be brought in tribal court); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194
U.S. 384, 393 (1904) (upholding a permit tax on animals for non-Indians);
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 948 (8th Cir. 1905) (upholding a permit tax for
non-Indians who desire the right to conduct business on reservation);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152154 (1980) (upholding sales tax on tobacco products for non-Indians on tribal
land).
224
Strate v. A 1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457-58 (1997).
225
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360.
226
Id. at 455-56.
227
Blaire M. Rinne, In Water Wheel, the Ninth Circuit Corrects a Limitation on
Tribal Court Jurisdiction, 32 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 47, 55-56 (2012).
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because the nonmember’s conduct “occurred on tribal land, the
activity interfered directly with the tribe’s inherent powers to
exclude and manage its own lands, and there are no competing
state interests at play.”228 The Water Wheel court relied on Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe and New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, both of which supported its finding of tribal court
jurisdiction without applying Montana. 229 In Merrion, the Court
upheld a tax imposed by the tribe on the oil and natural gas used or
taken from the reserve by a non-Indian mining company. The
Court found that “the power to tax is an essential attribute of
Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of selfgovernment and territorial management.”230 However, perhaps the
unintentional outcome of this jurisprudence is that when the tribe
could potentially win a case where Montana is applied, the court
instead determines that the tribe holds inherent sovereign authority.
When courts do apply Montana, an exchange of money or
other considerations is considerable evidence of a consensual
relationship, but ownership of the land is significant. For example,
the Montana Court held that a holder of a right-of-way who sold
electricity to individual tribal members “constituted a ‘consensual
relationship’ as defined by Montana.” 231 On the other hand, in
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Company
the court held that when an Indian couple sued a non-Indian bank
for discriminatory lending practices, no consensual relationship
existed.232 The Long family defaulted on its loans; the bank took
ownership of the land and proceeded to sell it to non-Indians, but
the family sued claiming the bank offered more favorable terms to

228

Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 814 (9th
Cir. 2011).
229
See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 812 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130, 144-45 (1982); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324, 330-31 (1983).
230
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
231
Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1051-52 (D.
Mont. 1999); see also Reservation Tel. Co-op v. Henry, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1015,
1023 (D.N.D. 2003) (the consensual relationship exception “has no application
to the facts of this case”); and Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co. v. Assiniboine &
Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 769, 772-75 (9th Cir. 2003) (no
consensual relationship existed between the recipient of the grant and the tribe,
but the court remanded for factual findings on whether the second Montana
exception applied).
232
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
320 (2008).
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non-Indians than it had to Indians. 233 The Supreme Court held
“that once tribal land is converted into fee simple, the tribe loses
plenary jurisdiction over it.”234 The resale of the land by the bank
to non-Indians did not implicate either of Montana’s exceptions
because “[a]ny direct harm to its political integrity that the tribe
sustains as a result of fee land sale is sustained at the point the
land passes from Indian to non-Indian hands.”235 Because rightsof-way, like the type granted to BNSF, do not convey fee title,236 a
tribe should retain fee ownership or the federal government should
retain the land in trust, but fee ownership is not always
dispositive.237
The Fifth Circuit walked a fine line between the two positions
in Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians.238 In
that case, John Doe, a 13-year-old Tribal member, sued
Dolgencorp, the operator of a general store on trust land, and Dale
Townsend, the manager of the general store, alleging sexual
abuse.239 Dolgencorp argued that Plains Commerce Bank altered
how courts should interpret the first Montana exception: in order to
trigger tribal jurisdiction, the court must find that a consensual
relationship exists and that it impacts self-governance or internal
relations. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that “[i]t
is hard to imagine how a single employment relationship between a
tribe member and a business could ever have such an impact.”240
This decision was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court,
suggesting that case law upholding a tribe’s civil jurisdiction in
cases arising on trust land and from a simple consensual
relationship is embattled and perhaps nearing its ineluctable end.
233

Id. at 321-22.
Id. at 328.
235
Id. at 336, 338.
236
See PROCEDURAL HANDBOOK, supra note 213; see also 7-60 THOMPSON
ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITIONS § 60.02(c) (2015) (“The right in
land held by an easement owner differs from the fee interest or even the
leasehold interest in that it is a ‘use’ interest, but not a ‘possessory’ interest in
land.”).
237
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (quoting Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (“[T]he ownership status of land ... is only one
factor to consider in determining whether regulation of the activities of
nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations,’ though ‘[i]t may sometimes be a dispositive factor’”).
238
Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169
(5th Cir. 2014) (aff’d by an equally divided Court in Dollar General Corp. v.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, __ U.S. __ 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016)).
239
Id. at 169.
240
Id. at 175.
234
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The BIA’s final rule simply states that the regulations “do not
limit the tribe’s inherent sovereign power to exercise civil
jurisdiction over non-members on Indian land” rather than define
what the limit might be.241 Section 169 of the new regulations also
add the grant of the right-of-way will not diminish to any extent []
[t]he Indian tribe’s jurisdiction over the land subject to, and any
person or activity within, the right-of-way.” 242 However, if the
Montana exceptions apply to a right-of-way grant, the BIA does
conclude in its response to comments that, because tribal consent is
required for a right-of-way, the grantee and the Tribe do enter into
a consensual relationship. 243 But this “represents [the] BIA’s
authoritative and contemporaneous interpretation of its own
regulation and was itself the product of the same notice-andcomment rulemaking.” 244 Whether the BIA’s interpretation of a
consensual relationship will prevail is unclear.
Tribes could increase the probability that conditions placed on
the right-of-way contract are valid by “includ[ing] [a] reservation
of tribal dominion or control over the right-of-way”245 emphasizing
the “landowners right to occupy and exclude.”246 When concluding
that the ICCTA and the IRWA can be read in harmony, Judge
Lasnik noted that the IRWA’s implementing regulations were
recently revised and “do not include any mechanism for STB
review of a right of way termination.” The Secretary of the Interior
“does not share BNSF’s opinion that the ICCTA abrogated the
BIA’s authority to terminate a railroad right of way across tribal
lands.” Arguably, this only furthers the perception that the ICCTA
and the IRWA really are in conflict. If so, until the issue is settled,
tribes agree to the grant of rights-of-way to railroads and many
other entities at their own peril without the knowledge that they
retain inherent control.
CONCLUSION
The United States Government should hesitate before placing
any limitation on the transportation of oil and other hazardous
241

Right-of-Way on Indian Land, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,327, 72,504 (Nov. 19, 2015).
25 C.F.R. § 169.10 (2016).
243
Id. at 72, 504.
244
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 34, Western
Energy Alliance v. D.O.I., 16-cv-00050-DLH-CSM (W.D. N.D. April 4, 2016).
245
Nord v. Kelly, 520 F.3d 848, 855 (8th Cir. 2008).
246
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 455-56 (1997).
242
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materials. Oil plays a critical role in our daily lives; it fuels our
cars and our homes and creates useful conveniences such as
plastics. Hazardous materials like oil are “essential to the economy
of the United States and the well being (sic) of its people.”247 That
being said, the efficient transportation of oil is not—nor should it
be—the only concern of the federal government.
It is the duty of federal courts to uphold the law. It was Chief
Justice Marshall who originally held that Indian tribes were
“distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil,
from time immemorial.248 Although tribes no longer retain such
broad “natural rights,” the trust relationship and the canons of
construction preserve the sense of duty and responsibility to tribes
within the United States.
Even if the BIA’s interpretation of its newly promulgated rules
stands under Montana, it faces another stiff test when rights-ofway on railroads or other methods of transportation are challenged
as preempted under the ICCTA. And they will be. For all parties
involved and those Indian tribes not directly involved, Swinomish
v. BNSF is an important case. On the merits, it has the potential to
drastically decrease crude oil transportation or severely diminish
the scope of tribal and BIA authority. Courts should embrace the
canons of construction and the trust relationship and give
deference to the Tribe’s authority under the Treaty of Point Elliott
and the IRWA. According to the Swinomish Tribe, acceptance that
the ICCTA preempts the IRWA means that it would “eviscerate
the IRWA and render it meaningless” if the shipper could show
that the contract interfered with its needs and interstate
commerce.249
Tribes should expressly reserve tribal dominion or control and
assert that any contract constitutes a consensual relationship
between the tribe and the entity with which it is contracting. The
Tribe should attempt to include provisions in any right-of-way
contract which clearly limit and prescribe the grant of the right-ofway. Most importantly, the tribe should recognize that the
unilateral “right” to termination within BIA’s new regulations may
not be absolute even if it is so stated in the contract.
247

Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Explosive by Rail, 68 Fed. Reg.
34,370, 34,472 (June 9, 2003).
248
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
249
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 15.

